Alternatives to Manufacturer Liability for Injuries Caused by the Sabin-Type Oral Polio Vaccines by Spence, Faye F.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 4 Article 5
Alternatives to Manufacturer Liability for Injuries
Caused by the Sabin-Type Oral Polio Vaccines
Faye F. Spence
Copyright c 1986 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Faye F. Spence, Alternatives to Manufacturer Liability for Injuries Caused by the Sabin-Type Oral Polio
Vaccines, 28 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 711 (1987), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/5
NOTES
ALTERNATIVES TO MANUFACTURER LIABILITY FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY THE SABIN-TYPE ORAL POLIO
VACCINES
Fewer than fifty years ago, the spread of poliomyelitis was a ma-
jor health crisis in the United States.' When research scientists fi-
nally developed an effective vaccine against the dreadful disease,'
public health officials and society at large viewed the discovery as a
modern miracle. Unfortunately, however, the long-awaited vaccine
has brought serious illness to a small number of its recipients.3 In
order to compensate these victims, many courts have imposed legal
liability on the vaccine manufacturers.4 This judicial response
raises serious competing policy concerns 5 which Congress recently
tried to resolve with legislation intended to compensate injured
vaccine recipients without compromising the effectiveness of public
health programs.
This Note examines the legal dilemma which led to the current
legislative proposal. The Note presents background information on
1. See infra text accompanying notes 7-10.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 12-14.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
4. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,
399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Fraley v. American Cyanamid Co., 589 F. Supp. 826 (D. Colo.
1984); Williams v. Lederle Laboratories, 591 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Grinnell v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Stahlheber v. American
Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970). Contra Berry v. American Cyanamid Co., 341
F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965); Sheehan v. Pima County, 135 Ariz. 235, 660 P.2d 486 (Ct. App.
1982); Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985); John-
son v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986); Dunn v. Lederle Labo-
ratories, 121 Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576 (1982); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,
532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1975).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 175-96.
6. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755
(1986). For a brief discussion and comment on the Act, see infra notes 197-210 and accom-
panying text.
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poliomyelitis and its vaccines and analyzes the legal theories under
which courts have allowed injured vaccine recipients to recover
from manufacturers. After discussing the competing policy con-
cerns these cases raise, the Note considers alternative solutions to
the problem, including the recently enacted legislation. The Note
concludes that courts should not impose liability on the manufac-
turers of these properly produced vaccines, but that the public
treasury instead should bear the cost of compensating those few
individual victims of vaccination programs that benefit the vast
majority of their recipients.
POLIOMYELITIS AND THE POLIO VACCINES
Poliomyelitis was once a devastating disease in this country,
crippling and killing thousands of children each year. In 1952
alone, polio struck 57,879 people, permanently paralyzing 21,296
victims." Scientists were unable to pinpoint the source of the incur-
able disease until 1950, when they discovered that polio is caused
by a highly contagious virus that enters the body through the
mouth and attacks the intestinal tract." More than eighty percent
of the population acquires a natural immunity to the disease,9 but
when polio strikes a vulnerable individual the virus spreads from
the intestines to the spinal column, causing damage to the nervous
system and muscular paralysis. 10
In contrast to the innumerable varieties found in most viruses,
only three variations of the polio virus exist-Type I, Type II, and
Type III." Combatting the illness, therefore, requires only three
variants of vaccine. Dr. Jonas Salk developed the first set of effec-
tive vaccines by chemically killing samples of each cultured virus
type and injecting the dead virus into a human body. The presence
of the dead virus stimulates the production of antibodies which
7. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 489 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974).
8. Id. at 1295.
9. Note, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manufacturers' Liability for Failure to Warn,
29 VAND. L. REv. 235, 237 (1976).
10. Reyes, 489 F.2d at 1296.
11. Note, supra note 9, at 237 n.18 (citing Sabin, Oral Poliovirus Vaccine, 194 J.A.M.A.
872, 873 (1965)).
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fight off any polio virus that subsequently enters the body.12 After
the United States government and research groups thoroughly
tested the Salk vaccines and found them to be completely safe, 13
manufacturers marketed these medications in 1955. Vaccinees then
received three initial shots, one for each type of virus, and "booster
shots" every few years.1 4
Later in the 1950s, Dr. Albert Sabin developed the oral polio
vaccine, consisting of live but weakened virus particles.15 After
thorough government testing, licensed manufacturers marketed
Sabin-type oral vaccines in 1960.16 The Division of Biologic Stan-
dards, a branch of the Department of Health and Human Services,
continues to test each lot of oral polio vaccine before manufactur-
ers market the drug.17
Testing has demonstrated that the Sabin-type vaccine is more
effective than the Salk vaccine' 8 mainly because the oral dose actu-
ally immunizes the recipient's intestinal tract, where the virus nor-
mally breeds.19 The oral vaccine also protects unvaccinated persons
by suppressing the full-strength virus-wild virus-which other-
wise could spread throughout the community. 0 The lack of need
for syringes or followup treatments also makes the oral vaccine
12. Reyes, 489 F.2d at 1296.
13. The Salk vaccine is completely safe only when properly manufactured. A well-publi-
cized manufacturing accident, in which live virus inadvertently remained in the killed-virus
vaccine, occurred in Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr.
320 (1960).
14. Reyes, 489 F.2d at 1296.
15. Id.
16. Note, supra note 9, at 238.
17. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1968). The extensive
regulations pertaining to oral polio vaccines are codified in 21 C.F.R. §§ 630.10-.17 (1986).
Manufacturing or selling the vaccine in violation of these regulations is a crime. 42 U.S.C. §
262 (1982).
18. Until recently, Finland and Sweden used the Salk vaccine exclusively. Between Octo-
ber 1984 and January 1985, however, five people in Finland became infected with polio. Two
of these victims had received five previous Salk vaccine injections. These incidents forced
the Finnish government to reevaluate the effectiveness of the Salk-type vaccines. Kearl v.
Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 818 n.1, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455 n.1 (1985).
19. Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 500 F.2d 1059
(3d Cir. 1974).
20. Boffey, Polio: Salk Challenges Safety of Sabin's Live-Virus Vaccine, 196 SCIENCE 35
(1977). But see id. (contact with recent vaccinee may cause contraction of the disease); see
also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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easier and less expensive to administer. This simplicity makes the
vaccine more useful in mass immunization programs. 21 Finally, the
oral polio vaccine is available in trivalent form, which means that a
single dose vaccinates against all three types of polio.22 For these
reasons, the United States Public Health Service and all interested
medical advisory organizations prefer the Sabin oral polio vaccine
over the Salk-killed virus-vaccine.23 Consequently, American
manufacturers have stopped producing the Salk vaccine; it has
been unavailable commercially in the United States since 1968.24
The mass immunization campaigns launched after the develop-
ment of these vaccines have been very successful; in 1970, for ex-
ample, physicians diagnosed only thirty-three cases of polio.2 5 Two
years after the marketing of Sabin-type vaccines, however, the
Public Health Service noticed that a small number of people con-
tracted the disease within thirty days of receiving the oral vac-
cine.26 The service responded by establishing an advisory commit-
tee to study these incidents. In 1964, the committee published a
report concluding that investigators could not link conclusively any
individual case of polio to the vaccine,27 but the committee still
believed that a causal connection existed between the vaccine and
some cases of polio. 28 The estimated risk of contracting polio di-
rectly from an oral vaccine is one chance in 11.5 million distributed
doses.29 Scientists also believe that unvaccinated people may be ca-
pable of contracting the disease from contact with a recent vac-
21. Note, supra note 9, at 238.
22. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1296 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974).
23. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 818, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455
(1985).
24. Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from the
Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CAL. L. REV. 754, 761 (1977).
25. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1269-70. Part of the campaign against polio included the passage of
state laws requiring children to be vaccinated before attending school. See infra note 151
and accompanying text.
26. Note, supra note 9, at 239.
27. SPECIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ORAL POLIOMYELITIS VACCINE, REPORT TO THE SUR-
GEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 5 (1964).
28. Id. at 4.
29. Boffey, supra note 20, at 35. The risk varies depending on the type of polio involved.
The vaccine against virus Type III poses the highest risk-approximately 1 chance per 1
million doses-but the risk to adults is greater than the risk to children. Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 124 (9th Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 28:711
1987] POLIO VACCINE-RELATED INJURIES 715
cinee; when contact polio victims are included in the statistics, the
total risk of vaccine-related illness is close to one chance in 2.5 mil-
lion doses.30 After courts began imposing liability on manufactur-
ers for these alleged vaccine-related injuries,"1 manufacturers be-
gan warning physicians of the risks associated with Sabin-type
vaccines.32
30. Boffey, supra note 20, at 35.
31. E.g., Davis, 399 F.2d at 131; Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48
(Mo. 1970).
32. The major reference manual on pharmaceutical products contains the following warn-
ing on Orimune, the most popular Sabin-type vaccine currently used:
Adverse Reactions: Paralytic disease following the ingestion of live poliovirus
vaccines has been, on rare occasion, reported in individuals receiving the vac-
cine,. . . and in persons who were in close contact with vaccinees. The vaccine
viruses are shed in the vaccinee's stools for at least 6 to 8 weeks as well as via
the pharyngeal route. Most reports of paralytic disease following ingestion of
the vaccine or contact with a recent vaccinee are based on epidemiological
analysis and temporal association between vaccination or contact and onset of
symptoms. Most authorities believe that a causal relationship exists.
The risk of vaccine-associated paralysis is extremely small for vaccinees, sus-
ceptible family members, and other close personal contacts . . . . [D]uring the
years 1969 through 1980 approximately 290 million doses of [oral polio vac-
cine] were distributed in the United States. In the same 12 years, 25 "vaccine-
associated" and 55 "contact vaccine-associated" paralytic cases were reported.
PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE 1023 (40th ed. 1986) (footnote omitted). The warning also ad-
vises doctors to warn patients about these risks and recommends Salk-type vaccine as an
alternate or introductory vaccine. Id. The same information appears on the package inserts
accompanying each lot of vaccine sold to doctors, pharmacists, and clinics. Williams v. Led-
erle Laboratories, 591 F. Supp. 381, 384 (S.D. Ohio 1984). Furthermore, at mass immuniza-
tion clinics, vaccine recipients or their guardians sign consent forms containing the following
similar warning:
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT POLIO AND POLIO VACCINE.
Please read this carefully. [The risk of contracting polio is very low] even for
someone who is not vaccinated . . . . [Oral polio vaccine is] one of the best
ways to prevent polio . ...
POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS FROM THE VACCINE: Oral live polio vac-
cine rarely produces side effects. However, once in about every 4 million vac-
cinations, persons who have been vaccinated or who come in close contact with
those who have recently been vaccinated are permanently crippled and may
die. Even though these risks are very low, they should be recognized. The risk
of side effects from the vaccine must be balanced against the risk of the dis-
ease, both now and in the future.
. . . Besides the oral polio vaccine, there is also a killed polio vaccine given
by injection which protects against polio after several shots. It has no known
risk of causing paralysis. Most experts do not feel it is as effective as the oral
vaccine for controlling polio in the United States. It is recommended for per-
sons needing polio vaccination who have low resistance to infections (or those
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Parties seeking damages from a manufacturer for injuries caused
by its product have three alternative theories of recovery: negli-
gence, breach of warranty-express or implied, and strict liability
in tort.3 In cases involving vaccine-induced polio or contact polio,
most plaintiffs have proceeded under strict liability in tort,34 but
courts have allowed recovery for vaccine-related injuries under all
three theories.
Negligence
Courts impose negligence liability on manufacturers who cause
foreseeable harm by marketing a product without exercising rea-
sonable care under the circumstances. 5 A manufacturer's negli-
gence may involve either marketing a flawed product-one that is
different from the product intended-or failing to warn about the
product's inherent risks. 6 Sabin-type oral polio vaccines are not
flawed products; they are exactly what the manufacturer in-
tended.3 7 Any negligence liability imposed on the manufacturers of
Sabin-type vaccines, therefore, must arise from a negligent failure
to warn.
The crux of negligence is foreseeability; thus, a manufacturer's
duty to warn extends only to risks that are known or that should
be known in the exercise of ordinary care-constructively known
who live with them) and for unprotected adults traveling to a place where polio
is common. It is not widely used in this country at the present time, but it is
available. If you would like to know more about this type of polio vaccine,
please ask us.
Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 819, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 456 (1985).
33. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 683-84 (1984).
34. See infra notes 59-173 and accompanying text.
35. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 33, § 96, at 683-84.
36. Id. at 685.
37. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974). The court stated:
Wyeth Vaccine Lot No. 15509 was exactly what its makers . . . intended it
to be: trivalent live-virus Sabin oral polio vaccine. The live virus which the jury
concluded caused Anita's poliomyelitis was not inadvertently included in the
mixture. Indeed, it is the presence of the living but attenuated Type I, IT, and
III viruses which makes the Sabin vaccine so effective . . ..
Id. (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 28:711
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risks.38 In Stahiheber v. American Cyanamid Co.,39 the Supreme
Court of Missouri upheld a jury verdict against the manufacturer
of a Sabin-type vaccine for negligent failure to warn. The manufac-
turer admitted that no warning had been given at all.40 The court
stated that the manufacturer should have known the vaccine might
cause polio because of information contained in the Advisory Com-
mittee Report to the Surgeon General.4 Because the manufacturer
knew of the risk, at least constructively, it should have warned
about the foreseeable danger.42
Stahiheber differs from the more recent vaccine-induced polio
cases because manufacturers now give physicians and vacinees
some warning about the dangers of oral polio vaccines.4 3 A manu-
facturing company may nevertheless violate its duty to warn of
known or constructively known risks by giving an inadequate
warning; an inadequate warning may be too vague or may not be
calculated to reach those people to whom harm is reasonably fore-
seeable. 44 Courts determine the adequacy of a warning under negli-
gence standards in the same manner as they do under the strict
liability theory:
[I]n all warning cases-even if the plaintiff or the court
claims to analyze failure to warn or inadequacy of warn-
ing in the context of a strict products liability claim-the
tests actually applied condition liability on the defend-
ant's having actually or constructively known of the risk
that triggers the warning."
Because of this similarity, the adequacy-of-warning issue is ana-
lyzed in the discussion of strict liability.46
38. Comment, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn Cases-Distinctions
and Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 228, 229, 240-41.
39. 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970).
40. Id. at 59.
41. Id. at 58.
42. Id.
43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 33, § 96, at 685.
45. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 832, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 465-66
(1985).
46. See infra notes 97-122 and accompanying text.
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Breach of Warranty
A manufacturer's warranty may be either express or implied. An
express warranty exists when the manufacturer makes a promise or
a statement of fact about the quality of certain goods, and the
statement becomes part of the basis of the bargain.47 If the goods
are not the same quality as the manufacturer has promised, the
manufacturer has breached the express warranty. The breach oc-
curs even if the manufacturer's misrepresentation was made in
good faith and without actual or constructive knowledge of the
true quality of the goods.48
In Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,49 the California Court of Ap-
peals upheld a jury's determination that the manufacturer of a po-
lio vaccine breached its express warranty. 50 The package insert ac-
companying the subject vaccine stated that "there are no known
contraindications to oral polio virus vaccines."'51 The court held
that the statement was an express warranty because consumers
reasonably rely on the superior knowledge of pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers.2 The fact that the plaintiff developed polio therefore
constituted a breach of this warranty. 3
Grinnell differs from more recent cases because manufacturers
no longer expressly represent oral polio vaccines to be harmless. 5 4
Even in the absence of such representations, however, the law may
impose certain implied warranties on manufacturers. 5 Subject to
certain defenses,56 a manufacturer is liable for breach of an implied
47. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978).
48. Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., 12 Cal. 2d 501, 510, 86 P.2d 102, 111 (1939).
49. 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969).
50. Id. at 441-42, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
51. Id. at 439, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
52. Id. at 440, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
53. Id. at 441-42, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
55. Under the implied warranty of merchantability, a manufacturer implicitly promises
that the product is reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such products are
used. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). When the manufacturer knows the buyer's purpose and knows
that the buyer is relying on the manufacturer's skill and judgment in furnishing suitable
goods, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises. Id., § 2-315.
56. Lack of privity is a major defense to breach of warranty actions. In Berry v. American
Cyanamid Co., 341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984), the court denied breach of warranty recovery to
an injured polio vaccinee because he lacked privity with the manufacturer. Id. at 17. Other
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warranty regardless of fault.57 Because the theory of strict liability
in tort has superseded implied warranty concepts in most jurisdic-
tions, however,58 this Note does not discuss the implied warranty
theory.
Strict Liability in Tort
The basic theory of strict liability in tort is codified in section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, which imposes liability
on a seller for injuries caused by products "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user,""9 regardless of the seller's
fault." To prove liability, the plaintiff must prove that the product
was defective when it left the seller/manufacturer's control and
that the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury."' Because
of the large number of vaccine-induced polio cases decided under
strict tort liability principles, this Note analyzes these issues
separately.
Defectiveness
Section 402A applies to products "in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous. '6 2 The drafters intended "unreasonably
defenses include disclaimer and lack of notice. Grinnell, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 443 n.3, 79 Cal.
Rptr. at 373 n.3.
57. See, e.g., 274 Cal. App. 2d at 433, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
58. Id. at 432, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Further, the court noted that the defenses available in
actions for breach of warranty are not available in actions based on strict liability. Id. at 433
n.3, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 373 n.3.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The section provides in full:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if:
*(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
-(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
*(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
60. Id. at comment a.
61. Note, supra note 9, at 244-45.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dangerous" to define or modify "defective, ' 3 but some courts have
treated the terms as two separate elements. 4 One commentator
has suggested that "defective" was used to indicate that something
must be wrong with the product before strict liability will attach. 5
This Note, however, considers a "defective" product under section
402A as one more dangerous than a reasonable consumer would
expect.
A product may be defective in either manufacturing, design, or
warning.6 6 A manufacturing defect exists when some error in the
manufacturing process produces a product different in quality
from that intended.67 As previously mentioned," however, the Sa-
bin vaccines are exactly what they are supposed to be; they are not
the result of any manufacturing error. If the Sabin-type vaccine is
to be considered defective, then the defect must be either its de-
sign or its warning.
Design Defects
The Sabin oral polio vaccines are "designed" so that weakened
live polio virus will enter the body's intestinal tract and stimulate
the body's immune system. Unfortunately, this attenuated virus
allegedly causes polio in a minute number of recipients.6 9 Because
a reasonable recipient would not expect to contract from a vaccine
the very disease that he or she sought vaccination against, the Sa-
bin-type vaccine might be considered defectively designed under
the traditional definition of defect.
63. Id. at comment i; see also Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 30, 32 (1973).
64. E.g., Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 822, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 458
(1985).
65. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830
(1973).
66. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58; Note, supra note 9, at 245.
67. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 33, § 99, at 695. For a case involving a manu-
facturing defect, see Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr.
320 (1960). In Gottsdanker, a batch of defectively manufactured Salk (killed-virus) polio
vaccine inadvertently contained live polio virus and caused injury to two vaccine recipients.
Id. at 605, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 322; see also Comment, Strict Liability for Drug Manufacturers:
Public Policy Misconceived, 13 STAN. L. REV. 645 (1961) (discussing Gottsdanker).
68. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
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The drafters of the Restatement, however, recognized that some
highly useful products, especially drugs, are "unavoidably unsafe,"
and that given the present state of scientific knowledge, those
products cannot be made any safer.70 When manufacturers prop-
erly produce unavoidably unsafe products that are accompanied by
an adequate warning, the seller "is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use."'71 In other
words, the law will not impose liability without fault on the manu-
facturers of such products.
Several policy considerations support the Restatement position
against strict liability for manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe
drugs. First, imposition of strict liability may delay the marketing
of badly needed medications while manufacturers conduct cumula-
tive safety tests on new drugs.72 Additionally, the prohibitive cost
of insuring new drugs against strict liability may prevent manufac-
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment k (1965). The comments provides:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies,
which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, prop-
erly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not de-
fective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally
be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experi-
ence as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualifi-
cation that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is
given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
71. Id.
72. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 822, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 459-60
(1985); Note, supra note 9, at 261. Consider the potentially fatal consequences to many
AIDS victims if manufacturers refuse to release AZT until further tests are run on the drug.
Daily Press/Times Herald (Newport News, Va.), Sept. 20, 1986, at C4, col. 1.
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turers from developing and selling new products. 73 Companies con-
ceivably might stop manufacturing vital products already in exis-
tence; for example, only one company continues to manufacture
Sabin vaccines.7 4 Finally, potential strict liability may force manu-
facturers to raise the prices of such medications in order to dis-
tribute their losses. Such price increases might make medications
unaffordable to those who need them most.75
Those who favor imposition of strict liability even for unavoid-
ably unsafe drugs argue that manufacturers are so profit-oriented
that they will not use adequate care in developing and marketing
new drugs unless they are threatened with such liability.7 6 This ar-
gument is not persuasive, however, because manufacturers already
are highly motivated to market safe and useful products. Strict
government regulations, stiff competition in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, concern for reputation, and fear of negligence liability all
provide strong incentives for drug manufacturers to exercise the
utmost care. Imposition of strict liability merely would make
manufacturers insurers of their products, a result not intended by
section 402A. 5
To determine whether a potentially dangerous medication is un-
avoidably unsafe, courts employ in essence a risk-benefit analysis.
If the medication's risks outweigh its benefits, the drug is "unrea-
sonably dangerous per se," and the manufacturer is liable for any
resulting injuries.79 If the benefits outweigh the risks, the product
73. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459; Note, supra note 9, at 262. For
example, many companies were reluctant to market a swine flu vaccine. Baynes, Liability
for Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations and Some Reflections on the
Swine Flu Experience, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 44, 71 (1977).
In addition to insurance costs, the research and development costs incurred to introduce a
new drug are staggering. "At the present time, it can cost more than $100 million to move a
new drug from the laboratory through the FDA approval process to the consumer." STAN-
DARD & POORS, INDUSTRY SURVEYS H 22 (1987).
74. Comment, Informed Consent to Immunization: The Risks and Benefits of Individual
Autonomy, 65 CAL. L. REv. 186, 1286 n.2 (1977); see also Note, supra note 9, at 235.
75. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 460-61.
76. Comment, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Respon-
sibility for Drug-Related Injuries Under Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 199, 216 (1984).
77. Note, supra note 9, at 261.
78. Id. at 244.
79. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974).
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is unavoidably unsafe, and the manufacturer is not subject to strict
liability, as long as an adequate warning accompanies the
product."s
Because the only alternatives to the Sabin vaccine are the Salk
vaccine or no vaccine at all, the risk-benefit analysis clearly places
the Sabin vaccine in the unavoidably unsafe category. The relevant
factors to consider in a risk-benefit comparison of two different
prescription medications are cost, ease of administration, effective-
ness, and individual safety.8 ' Compared to the Salk vaccine, the
Sabin vaccine is inexpensive and easy to administer. Only one oral
dose is required, rather than three costly-and pain-
ful-injections. 2 The Sabin vaccine also reduces the risk of the
dreadful disease more effectively because many unvaccinated peo-
ple become immunized merely from contact with orally vaccinated
individuals and because the oral vaccine suppresses the wild polio
virus in the intestines, thereby reducing the transmission of wild
virus to the environment.8 3 Although the same factors which make
the vaccine more effective also create the slight risk of contact po-
lio, eliminating this risk would reduce the vaccine's effective-
ness-its major benefit. This benefit to the population at large out-
weighs the minimal risk8 4 to individual safety.
The Sabin vaccine is certainly better than no vaccine. The
proper analysis, again, weighs the risk and magnitude of harm
against the vaccine's utility." The year before any vaccine was
available, polio afflicted more than 50,000 people, killing or crip-
80. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968).
81. Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 766. Professor Wade has suggested the following
seven factors for a risk-benefit analysis: 1) the usefulness of the product; 2) the availability
of safer products to meet the same need; 3) the likelihood of injury and its probably sever-
ity; 4) the obviousness of the risk; 5) public expectations; 6) the avoidability of injury; and
7) whether the danger can be eliminated without impairing the product's effectiveness.
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965). Regardless of which
test is used, all courts have agreed that the benefits of the Sabin-type vaccine outweigh the
risk of harm. Reyes, 408 F.2d at 1274; Davis, 399 F.2d at 128; Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,
172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 460-61 (1985); Johnson v. American Cyanamid
Co., 239 Kan. 279, -, 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (1986).
82. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text; see also Boffey, supra note 20, at 35.
84. Health officials report only one apparent case of vaccine-induced or contact polio for
every 2.5 million vaccinations given. See Boffey, supra note 20, at 35.
85. Reyes, 408 F.2d at 1274.
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pling nearly half of them.86 Eliminating such a disease is clearly
highly beneficial to society. Admittedly, the potential harm from
contracting vaccine-related polio is severe, but this risk is "statisti-
cally miniscule.1187 Although some courts and commentators have
observed that the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine is now
practically equal to the risk of catching it from a wild virus,88 the
risk of wild polio will increase substantially if large segments of
society discontinue vaccination programs. 9 The benefits of the Sa-
bin-type vaccine clearly outweigh its harms; each court that has
discussed the issue and its policy implications has found correctly
that the Sabin oral polio vaccine is unavoidably unsafe within the
meaning of the Restatement." Accordingly, the vaccine's manufac-
turers are not subject to strict liability for defective design; courts
will impose liability on the manufacturers only if the warning ac-
companying the vaccine is inadequate.9 1
Warning Defects
Most courts impose a duty to warn based on negligence stan-
dards, requiring the manufacturer to warn only of foreseeable
risks.2 One commentator, however, argues that manufacturers
should be liable even for failing to warn of unknown, undiscover-
able, and unforeseeable risks because the purpose of strict liability
is to place the burden of injury on one who markets the product,
regardless of fault.9 3 This minority view too closely resembles abso-
lute liability and would place unfair financial burdens on manufac-
turers. Obviously, a manufacturer cannot warn of scientifically un-
discoverable risks. In the face of such a requirement, soundly
managed companies understandably would refuse to develop and
86. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
87. Reyes, 408 F.2d at 1274.
88. Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 760 (citing Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399
F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968)).
89. Comment, supra note 74, at 1310 n.117.
90. Reyes, 408 F.2d at 1273; Davis, 399 F.2d at 128; Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172
Cal. App. 3d 812, 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 460-61 (1985); Johnson v. American Cyanamid
Co., 239 Kan. 279, -, 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (1986).
91. Johnson, 239 Kan. at -, 718 P.2d at 1323.
92. Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 762; see supra text accompanying note 38.
93. Comment, supra note 76, at 203.
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market new products. 4 This loss of progressive research would be
particularly unfortunate in the pharmaceutical industry, and al-
most certainly would affect the life and health of many people. In
cases involving vaccine-related polio, therefore, courts properly
have followed the majority rule, imposing a duty to warn only of
foreseeable risks.9 5 Under either negligence or strict liability stan-
dards, however, manufacturers do have a duty to warn about the
known risks of the Sabin vaccine.9 6 The critical issues, then, are
whether the present warnings are adequate and whether these
warnings are given to the proper individuals.
Adequacy of Warning
An adequate warning must be accurate and clear.9 7 The warning
must state the dangers honestly and understandably. Further, the
forcefulness of the warning must be proportionate to the risk and
must be sufficient to create caution in the user.98 Several plaintiffs
have alleged that the warnings accompanying the Sabin-type vac-
cine do not meet these requirements.
In Givens v. Lederle Laboratories," for example, the warning
stated that "it could not definitely be established that any such
case was due to the vaccine strain."'100 The court agreed that this
warning actually conveyed the idea that no true risk existed.1'0
Likewise, in Williams v. Lederle Laboratories,0 2 the court held
that a jury could find the warning inadequate because it "lacked a
sense of urgency and was reluctant in tone."' 03 The current warn-
ing, however, states that on rare occasions the Sabin vaccine causes
94. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
95. Williams v. Lederle Laboratories, 591 F. Supp. 381, 384 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Kearl v.
Lederle Labratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 832, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 465-66 (1985); Johnson v.
American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, -, 718 P.2d 1318, 1324-25 (1986); Dunn v. Led-
erle Laboratories, 121 Mich. App. 73, -, 328 N.W.2d 579-80 (1982).
96. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
97. Note, supra note 9, at 254.
98. Id. at 255.
99. 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
100. Id. at 1345.
101. Id.
102. 591 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
103. Id. at 385.
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polio in vaccine recipients or to those who come in contact with
recipients. 104
In Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co.,'05 the plaintiff objected
to the manufacturer's warning"'0 for several reasons. First, the
plaintiff argued that the reported risk was inaccurate because the
manufacturer did not take into account the number of distributed
but unused doses or the number of already vaccinated recipi-
ents.10 7 The Kansas Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting
that the risk was "very low" no matter which calculation the man-
ufacturer used. 0 The plaintiff also argued that the warning failed
to state that the risk of vaccine-related polio was greater for per-
sons who were not immune to polio, but the court considered that
fact to be obvious. 0 9 Finally, the plaintiff contended that the
warning failed to discuss the Salk vaccine as an alternative." 0 The
court rejected this argument because the Salk vaccine ceased to be
a viable alternative after United States manufacturers stopped
producing it."' Upon rejecting each of these arguments, the court
held the warning to be adequate and sufficient as a matter of
law." 2
The California Court of Appeals upheld the adequacy of a simi-
lar warning in Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories."3 The warning in
Kearl plainly stated both the risk of contracting polio from the
Sabin vaccine and the possibility of the Salk vaccine as a safer but
less effective alternative." 4 Nevertheless, the plaintiff argued that
an adequate warning should have stated that the risk of con-
tracting vaccine-related polio was equal to the risk of contracting
the wild polio virus." 5 The court rejected this argument because
104. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
105. 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986).
106. The warning in that case was very similar to the current warning. The only differ-
ence was that the Johnson warning reported statistics for a smaller number of years. Com-
pare note 32, supra, with 239 Kan. at -, 718 P.2d at 1325.
107. Id. at -, 718 P.2d at 1326.
108. Id. at -, 718 P.2d at 1326.
109. Id. at , 718 P.2d at 1326.
110. Id. at -, 718 P.2d at 1326.
111. Id. at -, 718 P.2d at 1326; see also Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 761.
112. 239 Kan. at - , 718 P.2d at 1326.
113. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
114. Id. at 834, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
115. Id. at 834, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
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the two probabilities, if measurable at all, would vary constantly.116
Further, because the possibility of injury from either source was
remote, as the warning had explained, the court saw no reason to
require manufacturers to provide statistical comparisons. 1m
Finally, the Michigan Court of Appeals also held that a manu-
facturer's warning was adequate even though the warning did not
advise its readers how to avoid contact polio.ll' The court stated
that methods of avoiding danger were too variable and individual-
ized to be a necessary part of manufacturer warnings. 19
These recent decisions of the Kansas, California, and Michigan
courts are sensible. The manufacturer's current warning conveys
the potential danger and its frequency. To require additional infor-
mation in the warning would be counter-productive. As one com-
mentator has noted, recipients may become desensitized and ig-
nore excessive warnings.1 20 Further, such exhaustive warnings
could confuse potential vaccine recipients and frighten them away
from important medical treatment. One could even argue that the
current warning places too much emphasis on the risks of vaccina-
tion and not enough emphasis on its benefits.1 2 Finally, the Food
and Drug Administration has approved the manufacturer warn-
ing. 22 If the government is satisfied that the warning is adequate,
then courts should not hold manufacturers liable for any alleged
inadequacy.
Recipient of Warning
Product liability law generally requires that a manufacturer
warn the intended or foreseeable users of any danger associated
116. Id. at - , 218 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
117. Id. at 835, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
118. Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories, 121 Mich. App. 73, - , 328 N.W.2d 576, 580 (1982).
119. Id. at - , 328 N.W.2d at 581.
120. Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 764 n.40; see also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher,
& Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability-Design Defect Litigation
Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 514-15 (1976) (arguing that placing too many warn-
ings on a product is like "crying wolf;" significant warnings no longer have an impact on the
user).
121. Comment, supra note 74, at 1309.
122. Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, -, 718 P.2d 1318, 1326 (1986);
Note, supra note 9, at 241.
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with a product.12 The law has developed an exception, however:
when the product is a prescription drug, a manufacturer may sat-
isfy its duty by warning the prescribing physician of the medica-
tion's dangers. 2 4 Several policy considerations justify this "learned
intermediary" exception. First, manufacturers would have great
difficulty warning the ultimate users of prescription drugs, because
such medications are regulated strictly and may be obtained only
through pharmacists or physicians. 25 Second, the user may lack
sufficient medical knowledge to understand the warning without
the help of his or her doctor.12
6
In spite of the exception for prescription medication, some
courts have imposed liability on the manufacturers of the Sabin
vaccine for failing to warn the ultimate recipient about the vac-
cine's dangers. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,'27 the plain-
tiff was vaccinated at a mass immunization clinic sponsored by
Idaho public health officials and the local medical society. Manu-
facturer warnings accompanied the sale of the Sabin vaccine to the
medical society, but no one communicated the warnings directly to
the vaccine recipients. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that although the prescription medication ex-
ception applies to drugs dispensed by a private physician, it did
not apply to drugs dispensed at mass clinics. 12s The court reasoned
that a private doctor would make an individualized evaluation of
the risks based on his knowledge of the patient's medical history
but that such a balancing of risks would not occur at public clin-
ics. 29 The manufacturer, therefore, had a duty to warn the ulti-
mate vaccine recipient, either by advertisements, posters, or con-
sent forms. 30 Having failed to give such a warning, the court held
the manufacturer liable for the plaintiffs injuries.' 31
123. Note, supra note 9, at 251.
124. E.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
125. Note, supra note 9, at 251-52.
126. Id.
127. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
128. Id. at 131.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit fol-
lowed the same reasoning in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories.132 Elab-
orating on the Davis decision, the court stated that public clinics
usually dispense Sabin vaccines "in an 'assembly line' fashion;
there is often neither time nor personnel to make an 'individual-
ized medical judgment' of the vaccinee's needs or susceptibili-
ties. ' 133 Further, the court noted that because most manufacturers
know that the vaccines will be distributed in this fashion, they eas-
ily can foresee that clinic patients will not receive adequate warn-
ings unless the manufacturers themselves provide a warning or
contractually obligate the clinic to provide one. This knowledge
and foreseeability obligated the manufacturers to warn ultimate
recipients about the dangers of the Sabin vaccine.13 4
Based on the decisions in Davis and Reyes, manufacturers whose
medications are dispensed at public clinics now provide the clinics
with warnings and consent forms which vaccine recipients or their
guardians must sign before the clinic will administer a vaccine. 135
This practice should not be necessary. The risk of a vaccinated
person contracting polio from the vaccine approximately equals
the same risk of an unvaccinated person contracting the disease
from a wild virus. 36 The social utility of these warnings is minimal;
furthermore, the warnings may in fact be detrimental. Misunder-
stood warnings from the manufacturer would frighten potential
vaccinees unnecessarily and unreasonable fear could seriously
hamper the success of important public health programs. 3 '
Additionally, many of the negative presumptions about mass
clinics are unwarranted. Although clinics cannot provide the same
degree of "personalized" service as a family practitioner, they are
managed by public health experts. In a well-designed vaccination
program, a doctor investigates the risks underlying the use of a
132. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
133. Id. at 1277.
134. Id.
135. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 819, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 456
(1985).
136. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
137. Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 759. The problems that could arise from misun-
derstood warnings are not limited to a select few; most people lack sufficient knowledge to
understand the warnings accompanying prescription drugs. See supra note 126 and accom-
panying text.
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particular vaccine, takes measures to limit such risks, then trains
support personnel to administer the vaccine. 13 8 The family doctor
cannot afford to make the same background investigation sur-
rounding the use of any one particular vaccine.
At the same time, mass clinics reasonably might choose not to
warn vaccinees of the risk. Doctors have a duty to act in their pa-
tients' best interests; if disclosure of the risks will frighten a pa-
tient out of receiving medically recommended treatment, the doc-
tor is not required to disclose that risk.'39 For that very reason,
many doctors do not warn their patients about the risks of the Sa-
bin polio vaccine, and the failure to warn does not constitute medi-
cal malpractice. 140 In such cases, the ultimate vaccinee does not re-
ceive a warning, but the manufacturer is not held liable for this
failure to warn. For the same reasons, manufacturers should not be
held liable if public clinics choose not to warn their patients.14 1
These factors indicate that courts should not require Sabin vac-
cine manufacturers to give warnings directly to vaccinees. Clinics
are fully capable of providing any necessary warnings, in their dis-
cretion, just as doctors do. Any further requirements might unrea-
sonably frighten the public and jeopardize medical efforts to eradi-
cate the polio virus. Nevertheless, manufacturers have begun
providing consent form warnings for Sabin vaccines. As long as
courts follow the precedent established in Davis and Reyes, manu-
facturers probably will continue their efforts to warn the ultimate
vaccine recipient.
Causation
In actions based on strict liability in tort, a plaintiff cannot re-
cover from the manufacturer of a defective product unless the de-
138. Note, supra note 9, at 253.
139. Comment, supra note 74, at 1299.
140. Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories, 121 Mich. App. 73, -, 328 N.W.2d 576, 583-84
(1982). The court stated that "the jury could find that reasonable physicians would have
acted no differently .... The doctor testified that, knowing the low incidence of vaccine-
associated polio cases, he chose not to warn Mrs. Dunn and that this was the customary
practice in the profession." Id.
141. Note, supra note 9, at 253-54; cf. Comment, supra note 75, at 1294-96 (comparing
manufacturer's duty to warn with a doctor's duty to obtain informed consent).
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fect proximately caused some injury."' Courts should not impose
liability on Sabin vaccine manufacturers either for giving inade-
quate warnings or for failing to warn the ultimate vaccinee unless
the plaintiff can prove that the vaccine and the defective warning
proximately caused the injury. Unfortunately, courts have not en-
forced proof of this element as stringently as they should.
Cause in Fact
As a preliminary issue, a plaintiff must prove that the vaccine
was a cause-in-fact of his injury. In other words, the plaintiff must
show that the vaccine itself, and not some external virus, produced
the polio. 4"
Medical experts have recognized the impossibility of proving
that a Sabin-type vaccine caused any particular case of polio.' 4 At
most, doctors can determine whether a patient's disease is "com-
patible with the possibility of vaccine-induced illness."' 45 The
causal link is even more tenuous when the victim allegedly con-
tracted the disease from contact with a vaccinee. In spite of this
lack of conclusive medical evidence, all courts have allowed juries
to find that the Sabin-type vaccine did cause polio in a particular
plaintiff, reasoning that juries can infer causation from such cir-
cumstantial evidence as the length of time between vaccination
and onset of illness. 46
This approach is unfair to manufacturers because juries may ig-
nore the evidence and return a verdict based on sympathy for the
injured plaintiff. In Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 4 7 for example,
the plaintiff was vaccinated during a polio epidemic in the commu-
nity. Fourteen days after vaccination, she manifested symptoms of
the disease. 148 In spite of expert testimony that the plaintiff's type
142. Note, supra note 9, at 245.
143. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974).
144. See, e.g., Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 434, 79 Cal. Rptr.
369, 375 (1969); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
145. Grinnell, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 436, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
146. Id.; see also Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1271; Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Co., 451
S.W.2d 48, 57 (Mo. 1970); Baynes, supra note 73, at 56.
147. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
148. Id. at 1270.
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of polio was more likely to be the wild type spreading through the
community, the jury returned a verdict in her favor. 4 ' By uphold-
ing such verdicts, courts allow plaintiffs to recover without proving
causation, an essential element for imposing liability.
Proximate Causation
Conceding that some cases of polio may be vaccine-related, a
more troubling issue is whether an allegedly inadequate warning is
the proximate cause of a vaccinee's polio. A plaintiff cannot re-
cover for injuries he or she would have sustained even if the manu-
facturer had given an adequate warning. 15 Courts, therefore, must
determine whether an adequate warning would have deterred the
plaintiff from receiving a Sabin-type vaccine.
The strongest argument for the manufacturers is that most
states require that children receive polio vaccinations before enter-
ing school.' 5' When considered in conjunction with compulsory ed-
ucation laws, these requirements prevent all but a few people from
exercising any real choice as to whether they will take the vaccine.
The Sabin vaccine is unlike other products, which consumers may
choose to use or reject. Under these circumstances, therefore,
presuming that a different warning would deter vaccination is in-
149. Id. at 1271. The odds of catching wild-virus polio were one in 3,000, but the risk of
vaccine-induced injury was one in 5.88 million, according to experts from Johns Hopkins
University. Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 758.
150. E.g., Williams v. Lederle Laboratories, 591 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
151. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 22.1-271.2 (1985). The statute provides in part:
IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS.-A. No student shall be admitted by a school
unless at the time of admission the student or his parent or guardian submits
documentary proof of immunization to the admitting official of the school or
unless the student is exempted from immunization pursuant to subsection C
C. No certificate of immunization shall be required for the admission to
school of any student if (i) the student or his parent or guardian submits an
affidavit to the admitting official stating that the administration of immunizing
agents conflicts with the student's religious tenets or practices; or (ii) the
school has written certification from a licensed physician or a local health de-
partment that one or more of the required immunizations may be detrimental
to the student's health, indicating the specific nature and probable duration of
the medical condition or circumstance that contraindicates immunization.
Id. The statute requires vaccinations against diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, poliomy-
elitis, measles, and mumps. VA. CODE §§ 22.1-271.1, 32.1-46 (1985).
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appropriate. 152 The court in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories153 re-
jected this logical argument, stating that an adequately warned pa-
tient might choose to receive a Salk-type vaccine rather than
Sabin, 1 4 but the court's decision ignored the fact that Salk vac-
cines are no longer manufactured in this country.155 The Arizona
Court of Appeals viewed the situation more realistically in
Sheehan v. Pima County,156 holding that the unavailability of an
alternative vaccine contradicted any presumption that the plaintiff
would have heeded an adequate warning. 57
One commentator has suggested imposing liability on manufac-
turers for inadequate warnings regardless of causation, reasoning
that individuals have a right to "informed consent" even when vac-
cines are required by law. 58 The right of each person to make an
intelligent choice in deciding whether to submit to medical treat-
ment is the basic thrust of informed consent. 59 Patients have no
choice when the medical treatment is required by law, rendering
the doctrine of informed consent meaningless.
A community epidemic is another context in which people might
receive the Sabin-type vaccine in spite of an adequate warning. In
such a situation, the risk of vaccine-related illness is extremely low,
while the risk of contracting a wild virus is higher. In Cunningham
v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 60 the court held that reasonable persons
might choose vaccination during an epidemic even if they had been
warned of the vaccine's risks.' 6 ' Accordingly, the plaintiff in Cun-
ningham was not entitled to a presumption that the allegedly in-
adequate warning proximately caused his injury. 1 2
Finally, when private physicians act as "learned intermediaries,"
they may be in the practice of not warning patients about statisti-
152. Note, supra note 9, at 258-59.
153. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
154. Id. at 1293. The court suggested the same unrealistic alternative in Givens v. Led-
erle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir. 1977).
155. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
156. 135 Ariz. 235, 660 P.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1982).
157. Id. at 238-39, 660 P.2d at 490.
158. Comment, supra note 74, at 1313.
159. Id. at 1295.
160. 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1975).
161. Id. at 1382.
162. Id.
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cally insignificant risks associated with medications. 16 3 If so, the
adequacy of a manufacturer's warning is irrelevant, because the
uninformed patient would almost certainly follow the doctor's ad-
vice and receive the vaccine. The doctor's practice of not warning
his or her patients about such risks would be the actual proximate
cause of any injury, superseding the manufacturer's alleged negli-
gence. The court rejected this argument in Williams v. Lederle
Laboratories,"' reasoning that an adequate warning might per-
suade the doctor to change his practice and warn a potential vac-
cinee of the risks.'6 5 In reaching this decision, the court ignored the
testimony of the plaintiff's doctor, who admitted that he still chose
not to warn his patients about the dangers of the Sabin-type vac-
cine even after the plaintiff's unfortunate injuries.16 6 In Dunn v.
Lederle Laboratories,6 7 however, the Michigan Court of Appeals
properly recognized that a physician's failure to warn his patient of
a known risk could destroy the causal connection between the
manufacturer's allegedly inadequate warning and the plaintiff's
injuries.6 8
An adequate warning is unlikely to deter people from receiving
the Sabin-type vaccine. Competent physicians may choose not to
convey such warnings to frightened patients. Even individuals who
are warned reasonably may recognize that the risk of vaccine-re-
lated illness is too low to be a serious concern. Most significantly,
polio vaccines are required by law, and the Sabin-type vaccine is
the only effective vaccine available in this country. An allegedly
inadequate warning, therefore, could not logically be considered
the proximate cause of any vaccine-induced illness.
Summary
Courts have decided most vaccine-induced injury cases on strict
liability principles. Because the Sabin-type vaccine is extremely
useful to society, however, courts have classified the drug as an un-
163. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
164. 591 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
165. Id. at 387.
166. Id. at 386.
167. 121 Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576 (1982).
168. Id. at -, 328 N.W.2d at 582.
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avoidably unsafe product, imposing liability on the manufacturer
only when the warning accompanying the vaccine is inadequate
and this inadequacy proximately causes the plaintiff's illness."6 9 Al-
though courts agree on these legal principles, varying applications
of these principles has led to inconsistent verdicts and uncertain
results for injured plaintiffs.
The more recent better-reasoned decisions have held the revised
manufacturer warning to be adequate in content,17 0 but most
courts require the manufacturer to convey this warning directly to
the vaccinee, unless a private physician acts as a "learned interme-
diary."' 1' 1 This Note suggests that a warning to public immuniza-
tion clinics, rather than to ultimate vaccinees, should be sufficient
to discharge the manufacturer's duty.11 2
Courts also are divided on whether inadequate warnings have
proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. The better-reasoned de-
cisions have held that most people would receive the vaccine even
if adequately warned about the risks, and therefore, that inade-
quate warnings are not the proximate cause of these injuries.17 3
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the policy concerns present in the discussion of
strict liability, 74 broader public policy considerations permeate the
entire area of mandatory vaccination programs. Courts and legisla-
tures must balance the individual's right of autonomy against the
public interest in eliminating infectious diseases,1 5 and decision
makers then must determine who should bear the loss when pro-
grams for public benefit injure private individuals. 70
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the individ-
ual's constitutional right to privacy in making certain personal de-
169. See supra notes 69-91 and accompanying text.
170. See Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 834-35, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453,
467-68 (1985); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, -, 718 P.2d 1318, 1326
(1986).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 123-34.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 135-41.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 150-68.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
175. Note, supra note 9, at 250.
176. See Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 768; Comment, supra note 76, at 203.
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cisions. 1  This right to privacy includes the right to accept or re-
ject medical treatment. 17  The right to privacy is not absolute,
however; a compelling state interest, including protection of the
public health, can override the rights of a single individual.7 9
Preventing the spread of deadly infectious disease is obviously a
compelling interest, and the Supreme Court determined long ago
that statutory vaccination requirements are constitutional re-
straints on individual liberty, as long as the laws allow some excep-
tion for individuals uniquely endangered by vaccines, such as those
with immune system deficiencies. 180 The Court did not consider
the inherent risks of vaccination, including possible death or seri-
ous injury, to be unique dangers, reasoning that the legislature
would evaluate such risks before requiring vaccination.'8 '
State legislatures already have made a policy decision in favor of
public health and against personal autonomy by requiring school
children to be vaccinated against polio. 182 The contagiousness of
this disease and its tragic consequences justify such legislative de-
cisions.183 Nevertheless, the vaccination requirement also clearly
causes serious injury or death to some individuals. Providing com-
pensation for these victims is of paramount importance.8
Some commentators suggest that vaccine manufacturers should
bear the entire cost of compensating these victims, because manu-
facturers can distribute the cost evenly by raising their prices.8 5
Most scholars, however, recognize that the competitive pharmaceu-
177. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973).
178. E.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
179. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
180. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1904) (upholding mandatory small-
pox vaccine).
181. Id. at 36.
182. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
184. Leaving injured persons to bear the entire loss would be grossly unfair and is not a
viable option. The facts of Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
modified, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974), demonstrate the magnitude of losses associated with
polio; in that case, the financial costs alone included $89,223.25 for medical bills and
$49,142.40 in lost future income. Id. at 36. Placing a monetary value on the pain and suffer-
ing that a quadriplegic experiences is not really possible. Id. at 37.
185. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 76, at 203.
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tical industry prevents drug manufacturers from raising prices,'86
and that the cost of product liability insurance has become prohib-
itive.187 Imposing the burden on manufacturers through strict lia-
bility, therefore, may drive pharmaceutical manufacturers out of
business, leaving people unable to obtain needed medications. 88
One writer recommends a limited no-fault compensation system,
a type of absolute liability. 8 9 Under this system, manufacturers
would compensate victims for their actual injuries without regard
to the adequacy of the manufacturer's warning; however, injured
persons would not recover any damages for pain and suffering.
Theoretically, this system would compensate all victims without
sending manufacturers into bankruptcy, because money formerly
spent on litigation to prove lack of fault could be channeled di-
rectly to the victims.190 Realistically, however, this proposal does
not consider the true magnitude of actual damages, which them-
selves are sufficient to drive a manufacturer out of business, with
or without litigation expenses.' 9' Further, fraudulent claimants
might abuse this system, because proving the exact cause of polio
is difficult or impossible.192 Finally, imposing such expenses on a
faultless manufacturer is plainly unfair.
The most appropriate recommendation is that the government
bear the loss of compensating victims of vaccine-related polio. 93
186. See Baynes, supra note 73, at 44; Note, supra note 9, at 262. "Compared with other
major domestic industries, the drug industry exhibits below-average concentration, with no
one firm accounting for more than 8% of total U.S. sales." STANDARD & POORS, INDUSTRY
SURVEYS H 18 (1987). "Drug pricing is highly complicated, with many factors coming into
play in the determination of the final market price. Underlying the basic pricing structure
are the need to recoup heavy R & D costs, competitive conditions in the marketplace, and
the projected patent life of each drug. Id. at H 19. Although drug price increases have been
larger than the overall inflation rate for the past decade, the increases "reflect. . .a catch-
up from prior subinflationary pricing as well as efforts to compensate for [reductions in]
foreign earnings. . .[due to] strengthening of the dollar and restrictive foreign pricing reg-
ulations." Id.
187. See Baynes, supra note 73, at 44; Note, supra note 9, at 262; see also supra note 73
and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
189. Baynes, supra note 73, at 72-73.
190. Id.
191. See supra note 184.
192. Baynes, supra note 73, at 72-73.
193. Note, supra note 9, at 263.
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State governments already require the vaccinations.1 4 The federal
government has licensed the manufacturers and has approved the
distribution of the Sabin-type vaccine. 195 Because of principles of
sovereign immunity, the government has not been forced to con-
sider or bear the consequences of its decisions. 96 Imposing liability
on the government would force public officials to consider these
consequences, and then, if they choose to continue encouraging the
use of the Sabin-type vaccine, the public treasury would pay the
full cost of the program. Public funds should pay for programs that
benefit the whole society. When individual losses result from the
implementation of public programs, the public, rather than the
companies chosen to carry out the programs, should bear those
losses.
THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT
In response to the number of vaccine-related injuries and the
consequent staggering liability imposed on manufacturers, Con-
gress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986.11 As finally adopted, 98 the Act creates a claims system for
persons injured by certain routine vaccines, 99 including Sabin-type
194. See supra note 151.
195. Note, supra note 9, at 241.
196. Loge v. United States, 662 F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944
(1982) (sovereign immunity barred suit against the government for licensing Sabin-type vac-
cines); Franklin & Mais, supra note 24, at 767-68. But cf. Griffin v. United States, 351 F.
Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974) (allowed suit against the
government under Federal Tort Claims Act for failing to comply with its own mandatory
testing regulations).
197. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986).
198. The Senate incorporated the original House bill into S. 1744, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986), a comprehensive package of health legislation covering drug exports, peer review of
physicians, state mental health plans, health maintenance organizations, and Alzheimer's
disease. See 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 750 (Oct. 24, 1986). The House had al-
ready passed the larger legislative package on Oct. 17, 1986. 132 CONG. REc. H11,615 (daily
ed. Oct. 17, 1986).
199. The Act permits "any person who has sustained a vaccine-related injury" or their
legal representative to petition for compensation. § 2111(b)(a)(A), 100 Stat. at 3760. The
petition must contain an affidavit and supporting documentation that show the injured per-
son received one of the enumerated vaccines or "contracted polio, directly or indirectly,
from another person who received an oral polio vaccine." § 2111(c)(1)(A), 100 Stat. at 3760.
Those who contract polio from contact with a vaccinee must be United States citizens to file
a petition, § 2111(c)(1)(B)(ii), 100 Stat. at 3760; however, those who receive the vaccine need
738
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oral polio vaccines. This system would compensate the families of
injuried children with federal funds for all medical expenses not
otherwise paid by insurance companies; however, the Act limits
wrongful death awards and awards for pain and suffering to
$250,000, and bars punitive damages entirely. 00 Families not satis-
fied with the government-awarded amount could reject the auto-
matic compensation and sue the vaccine manufacturer directly, but
only under negligence principles-the Act abolishes strict liability
lawsuits against manufacturers of the designated vaccines.2 01 Fami-
not be citizens to file. See § 2111(c)(1)(B)(i), 100 Stat. at 3760. A claimant must file a peti-
tion to receive compensation under the program, §2111(a), 100 Stat. at 3758, or to bring a
civil action against a vaccine manufacturer for damages in excess of $1000. See § 2111(2)(A),
100 Stat. at 3759.
The Act also sets a limit of one petition per administration of a vaccine. § 2111(b)(2), 100
Stat. at 3760. When referring to the content of the petition, the Act states that "the person
who suffered such injury" must provide certain documentation, § 2111(c)(1), 100 Stat. at
3760 (emphasis added); therefore, the Act sets an arbitrary cut-off of one injury per
administration.
200. See § 2115, 100 Stat. at 3767-68. Compensation under the program falls into four
categories: first, actual unreimbursable expenses, covering costs already incurred and those
that will be incurred, § 2111(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3767; second, wrongful death-type award of
$250,000, § 2115(a)(2), 100 Stat. at 3767; third, loss of earning capacity, §2115(a)(3), 100
Stat. at 3767; and fourth, pain and suffering, limited to $250,000. § 2115(a)(4), 100 Stat. at
3768. Loss of earning awards for those who are injured after reaching age 18 are much more
flexible than awards for those injured before age 18. Compare § 2115(a)(3)(A), 100 Stat. at
3767-68 with § 2115(a)(3)(B), 100 Stat. at 3768. Punitive damages are prohibited specifically
in § 2115(d)(1), 100 Stat. 3768.
Although limiting pain and suffering damages and prohibiting punitive damages, the Act
does permit recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees. § 2115(e)(1)(A), 100 Stat. at 3768. The
attorney is limited to the statutory recovery; additional fees are prohibited. § 2115(e)(3), 100
Stat. at 3769.
201. Vaccine manufacturers are not liable for injury or death resulting from side effects
that were unavoidable if the vaccine was (1) properly prepared and (2) accompanied by
proper directions and warnings. § 2122(b)(1), 100 Stat. at 3773. A vaccine is presumed ac-
companied by proper directions and warnings if it complies materially with the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and § 351 of the Public Health Service Act, and regulations
thereunder. Plaintiffs can avoid this presumption (1) if the manufacturer engaged in fraudu-
lent-type conduct or (2) if he shows by clear and convincing evidence the manufacturer was
negligent. See § 2122(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 3773. In addition, no manufacturer can be held
liable solely for failing to provide direct warnings to the injured party. § 2122(c), 100 Stat. at
3773.
If a plaintiff does choose to sue, the trial occurs in three phases: liability, general damages,
and punitive damages. § 2123, 100 Stat. at 3774. In the first stage, liability is determined
under § 2122. § 2123(b), 100 Stat. at 3774. General damages are determined in the second
stage; here the statute defers to state law by omission. See § 2123(c), 100 Stat. at 3774.
Punitive damages are available, but are limited to situations where the manufacturer has
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lies would have ninety days to decide whether to accept the gov-
ernment's final award, but suit against the manufacturer would ir-
revocably forfeit the family's right to compensation from federal
funds.20 2
Although the Act definitely is a step in the proper direction, the
current legislation does not resolve the problem effectively. As
adopted, the Act will not take effect until Congress approves a new
tax plan to finance the compensation system. 20 3 Representative
Waxman originally proposed to place an excise tax on vaccine
manufacturers in proportion to their sales, with the resulting funds
to be placed in a special trust fund for victims. 204 In order to win
support from the House, however, Waxman dropped this proposal
from the bill.20 5 This indicates that Congress may have difficulty
enacting an appropriate tax plan to implement the program. Addi-
tionally, the Reagan administration, hostile toward both the Act
and any tax increases, can be expected to veto any tax plan ap-
proved by Congress.208 Without the necessary funding, the Act is
useless.
Even if implemented, the Act may not provide enough protec-
tion for manufacturers because the program still would allow law-
suits against them. The abolition of strict liability is relatively in-
significant because courts already consider the oral polio vaccine
unavoidably unsafe and thus exempt manufacturers from strict lia-
bility principles as long as manufacturers give an adequate warn-
ing.207 The adequacy of a warning is determined under negligence
principles, even in strict liability cases. 208 Consequently, plaintiffs'
engaged in fraudulent or criminal behavior which "related to the vaccine-related injury or
death." § 2123(d)(2), 100 Stat. at 3774.
202. See § 2121(a), 100 Stat. at 3772; see also Rovner & Kaplan, Vaccine Legislation
Advances in House Committee, on Floor, CONG. Q., Sept. 20, 1986, at 2243.
203. See Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. 99-660, § 323, 100 Stat. 3784; see also 14 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 750 (Oct. 24, 1986).
204. 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) at 732 (Oct. 17, 1986). In effect, such a plan still
would leave the cost on manufacturers. A sales tax, to be paid by the state and local govern-
ments who purchase the vaccines, would be more in line with the policy objectives discussed
in this Note. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
205. 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) at 732 (Oct. 17, 1986).
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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recoveries would not be limited significantly under the new law.20 9
Admittedly, recovery is unpredictable when plaintiffs resort to the
courts, and the most recent cases have held manufacturer warnings
to be adequate;210 therefore, most rational victims would choose to
accept compensation from the government, which is available auto-
matically and without proof 6f fault. The best legislation, however,
would compensate the victims, yet protect manufacturers from all
liability for highly useful, properly manufactured vaccines.
CONCLUSION
Polio, once a major disease in this country, has been eradicated
almost completely since the development of polio vaccines. To pre-
vent the recurrence of devastating epidemics, state governments
require school-age children to be vaccinated against polio; further-
more, the state makes free vaccinations available at mass immuni-
zation clinics. The vast majority of medical professionals recom-
mend the Sabin-type oral polio vaccine, which is the most effective
vaccine-and the only polio vaccine available in the United States
today. Unfortunately, the Sabin-type vaccine causes polio on rare
occasions.
In the past, courts have imposed strict liability on pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers, holding them financially liable to the few vic-
tims of vaccine-related polio. Strict liability is improper in these
209. One commentator has developed optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for the imple-
mentation of the Act. Under the optimistic scenario, "[n]o more than a couple hundred
claims are filed a year" and "[t]wo thirds are dismissed on their face" as nonvaccine related
injuries. Huber, Will New Vaccine Statute Give Shot in Arm to Tort Reform, Legal Times,
Mar. 9, 1987, at 9, col. 1, 10, col. 2. Further, "[r]easonably generous awards are made reason-
ably quickly," and then the claimants accept the awards without filing suit in the "second
round." Id.
Under the pessimistic scenario,"[c]laims alleging vaccine related injuries mushroom, and
plaintiffs receive overly generous awards, particularly in cases of questionable causation."
Id. at 10, col. 3. "The word now goes around that the first round is a slush fund for almost
anyone and the second round a still-active crap shoot for those with colorable claims." Id.
Because compensation is geared to the timing and severity of symptoms occurring after
receiving the vaccine, id. at 10, col. 4, and physician malpractice exposure decreases as gov-
ernment coverage rises, physicians will have an incentive to "fudge just a little bit" in favor
of the claimant. Id.
Which scenario will occur is unclear, however; the result will depend on the system's abil-
ity to ferret out false claims. See id.
210. See supra notes 105-19, 170 and accompanying text.
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cases because the vaccines are not defective nor is any alleged de-
fect the proximate cause of the victims' injuries. The Sabin-type
vaccine is exactly what it is intended to be, and scientists are una-
ble to make a safer vaccine of equal effectiveness. Adequately ex-
plicit warnings accompany the vaccines; requiring more urgent
warnings would not prevent the injuries.
Policy considerations also dictate against strict liability for man-
ufacturers. The high cost of liability may drive pharmaceutical
manufacturers out of business entirely, or at least lead them to
stop producing vaccines and other valuable medication, thereby se-
riously jeopardizing public health programs. Admittedly, individ-
ual victims deserve compensation for their injuries, but because so-
ciety has instituted the mandatory vaccination program for its own
benefit, society itself should bear the losses the program generates.
Congress recently passed legislation intended to compensate in-
jured vaccinees with government funds. The legislation still per-
mits tort-law suits against manufacturers, however, and therefore
does not provide manufacturers with sufficient protection. Further,
the compensation system will not be effective unless Congress en-
acts a plan to finance the proposed government fund. Better legis-
lation would protect manufacturers from all liability for unavoida-
ble risks and would ensure the availability of government funds to
compensate injured vaccine recipients.
Fay F. Spence
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